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I. INTRODUCTION
THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE is to present a brief
history and analysis of the recently proposed safe harbors under
the Anti-Kickback Statute' for managed care plans and risk-
sharing arrangements. By proceeding chronologically through the
official discussions and negotiations that culminated in the pro-
posed safe harbors, the reader will develop an appreciation for the
underlying policies upon which they are founded. After complet-
ing this historical overview, the safe harbors will then be analyzed
in detail with special attention given to potential problems likely to
develop if the rule is implemented as it now reads. In addition,
where possible, comparisons will be made to existing regulations
governing physician incentive plans and safe harbors which al-
ready exempt certain health plans from the Anti-Kickback Statute.
1 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994) (making it a felony to know-
ingly accept or solicit remuneration for referring individuals for services which may
not be paid for by a state or federal health care program and making it a felony to
make an offer of such payment).
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II. HISTORY
The Anti-Kickback Statute, enacted in 1972, provides crimi-
nal penalties for individuals or entities who knowingly and will-
fully offer, pay, solicit, or receive bribes, kickbacks, or other re-
muneration in order to induce business reimbursed by Medicare,
Medicaid, and other federal health care programs. The language of
the statute is very broad and there has been much concern since its
enactment that many innocuous and even beneficial arrangements
are prohibited by the literal language of the statute. Consequently,
in 1987, Congress enacted the Medicare and Medicaid Patient and
Program Protection Act 2 which authorizes the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) to promulgate regulations
"specifying payment practices that shall not be treated as a crimi-
nal offense under [42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b] and shall not serve as the
basis for an exclusion under [42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(7)]." These
regulations are commonly referred to as "safe harbors." To date,
HHS has promulgated two final rules, creating a total of thirteen
safe harbors under the Anti-Kickback Statute.
3
Section 216 of the Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)4 amended the Anti-Kickback Statute
to include additional exceptions to what would otherwise be pro-
hibited "remuneration" under the statute. One of these exceptions
was for certain types of managed care arrangements:
[A]ny remuneration between an organization and an indi-
vidual or entity providing items or services, or a combina-
tion thereof, pursuant to a written agreement between the
organization and the individual or entity if the organiza-
tion is an eligible organization under section 1395mm [of
the Social Security Act] or if the written agreement,
through a risk-sharing arrangement, places the individual
2 See generally Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of
1987, Pub. L. 100-93, 101 Stat. 680 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C. (1994)) (amending the Social Security Act to provide greater protection for
beneficiaries of the health care programs under that Act).
' See 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952 (1991) (implementing section 14 of Public Law 100-
93, the Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987); 61 Fed.
Reg. 2,122 (1996) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001) (discussing the publication of
two new safe harbors).
4 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub.
L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
(1994)) (amending the Anti-Kickback Statute to add exceptions for acts which would
otherwise be prohibited).
1999]
HEALTH MATRIX
or entity at substantial financial risk for the cost or utiliza-
tion of the items or services, or a combination thereof,
which the individual or entity is obligated to provide.
Upon closer examination, it becomes apparent that there are
actually two parts to this exception. 6 Each part focuses on a differ-
ent type of conduct to be removed from the definition of "remu-
neration." The first part exempts remuneration between an "eligi-
ble organization" and an individual or entity providing items or
services pursuant to a written agreement between the parties. In
contrast, the second part exempts remuneration between an organi-
zation and an individual or entity if a written agreement places the
individual or entity at substantial financial risk for the cost or utili-
zation of items or services.
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of HHS was statu-
torily mandated by section 216 of HIPAA to establish a negotiated
rulemaking committee under the Negotiated Rulemaking Act 7 and
5 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(F) (listing exceptions to the types of activities
that will be considered felonious in terms of referring people for services in exchange
for financial "kickbacks") (emphasis added).
6 For the sake of adding clarity to an area of law where little exists, the statu-
tory exception will be referred to as consisting of two "parts," whereas the proposed
interim final rule (discussed infra) will be referred to as having two "prongs." Some
sources use the terms interchangeably, causing confusion to the reader. Hopefully,
that problem will be avoided by use of this convention.
7 See Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. § 561-69 (1994). The Ne-
gotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 provides a famework for conducting negotiated
rulemaking and "encourages agencies to use negotiated rulemaking to enhance the
informal rulemaking process." 62 Fed. Reg. 28,420 (1997) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. pt. 1001). The Act requires the head of an agency to consider if:
I. There is a need for a rule;
2. There are a limited number of identifiable interests that will be signifi-
cantly affected by the nile;
3. There is a reasonable likelihood that a committee can be convened with a
balanced representation of persons who can adequately represent the
identified interests and are willing to negotiate in good faith to reach a
consensus;
4. There is a reasonable likelihood that the committee will reach a consen-
sus on the rulemaking within a specific period of time;
5. The negotiated rulemaking process will not unreasonably interfere with
the development and issuance of a final rule;
6. The agency has adequate resources and is willing to commit such re-
sources, including technical assistance, to the committee; and
7. The agency, to the maximum extent possible consistent with the legal
obligations of the agency, will use the consensus of the committee with
respect to developing the rule proposed by the agency for notice and
comment.
See 5 U.S.C. § 563 (a).
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to follow the standards for formation and use of advisory commit-
tees pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). 8
The purpose of the committee would be to negotiate the develop-
ment of an interim final rule interpreting these exceptions to the
Anti-Kickback Statute. Specifically, the rule should create a safe
harbor for:
(1) arrangements in which the [federal] government
makes a fixed payment to a Medicare health main-
tenance organization [(i.e., the first part of the ex-
ception)] and
(2) arrangements in which providers of medical serv-
ices are put at substantial financial risk for the items
and services ordered and reimbursed by Medicare
on a fee-for-service basis [(i.e., the second part of
the exception)]. 9
In creating this rule, the Committee would need to consider the
following factors:
(1) the level of risk appropriate to the size and type of ar-
rangement;
(2) the frequency of assessment and distribution of incen-
tives;
(3) the level of capital contribution; and
(3) the extent to which the risk-sharing arrangement provides
incentives to control the cost and quality of health care
services.
10
8 5 U.S.C. app. § 2 (1998) (establishing the Negotiated Rulemaking Committee
in accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act). Negotiations are con-
ducted by a committee chartered under the FACA. Federal agencies are required to
comply with the FACA if they develop or use a group that includes non-federal
members as a source of advice. The committee must include an agency representative
and an impartial facilitator. Its purpose is to reach a consensus on the language or
issues involved in a rule. If a consensus is reached, it is used as the basis for the in-
terim final rule. The rulemaking process does not affect the procedural requirements
of the FACA, the Administrative Procedure Act, or other statutes. See 62 Fed. Reg.
28,410 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001) (citing the purpose and goals of the
Negotiated Rulemaking Committee).
9 Ursula Himali, Advisory Group Gives Seal of Approval to Anti-Kickback Safe
Harbor, 2 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 69, 69 (Jan. 28, 1998) (discussing the
Negotiated Rulemaking Committee's two-pronged proposal to expand safe harbor
protection under the Anti-Kickback Statute).
10 62 Fed. Reg. at 28,411.
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On May 23, 1997, HHS announced in the Federal Register its
intent to form such a committee" which later became known as the
Negotiated Rulemaking Committee for the Shared Risk Exception
(the Committee).' 2 HHS stated that the Committee would consist
of persons representing interests likely to be substantially affected
by the interim rule13 and would be assisted by an impartial facili-
" See id. at28,410.
12 The name of the Committee is somewhat of a misnomer because its purpose
was to draft "safe harbors" - not "exceptions" - for managed care plans and risk-
sharing arrangements. This distinction is important in that exceptions to the Anti-
Kickback Statute are enacted only by Congress and are specified within the statute
itself. Safe harbors, on the other hand, are rules promulgated by HCFA, published in
the Federal Register, and subsequently codified in the Code of Federal Regulations
as administrative regulations. Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, if an individual's or
entity's conduct on its face is prohibited, and that conduct does not come within the
scope of a safe harbor, the most that can be said is that the individual or entity may
have violated the statute. Safe harbors only guarantee protection to individuals or
entities that satisfy their criteria. One cannot infer that conduct which fails to satisfy
the requirements of any safe harbor necessarily violates the Anti-Kickback Statute.
Contrast this with the physician self-referral statutes ("Stark laws"), for which there
are no safe harbors, only exceptions which can be implemented either legislatively by
Congress or administratively by HCFA. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1989, § 6204, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395nn (West Supp. 1998). If a physician's conduct on
its face is prohibited by the Stark laws, and that conduct does not come within an
exception (as contained within either the statute or regulations), he or she has violated
the statute.
13 HHS specified that the following organizations would be represented in the
Committee:
American Association of Health Plans
American Association of Retired Persons
American Health Care Association
American Hospital Association
American Medical Association
American Medical Group Association
Blue Cross Blue Shield Association
Consumer Coalition on Quality in Health Care
Coordinated Care Coalition
Department of Justice
Federation of American Health Systems
Health Industry Manufacturers Association
Health Insurance Association of America
National Association of Community Health Centers
Independent Insurance Agents of America/National Association of Health
Underwriters
National Association of Medicaid Fraud Control Units
National Association of State Medicaid Directors
National Rural Health Association
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association
The IPA Association of America
62 Fed. Reg. at 28,411-12.
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tator.'4 Although the list of participants is limited, "[t]he intent in
establishing the negotiating committee is that all interests are rep-
resented, not necessarily all parties."' 5 HHS set a deadline for the
Committee to reach a consensus' 6 on part or all of the interim final
rule within six months after the Committee's first meeting.17 The
Committee is then to recommend through the OIG, that the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services adopt the Committee's consen-
sus.' 8 Subsequently, the interim final rule by HHS will be pub-
lished in the Federal Register, followed by a sixty-day comment
period. 9 The Committee may later recommend specific changes to
the interim final rule in response to comments received by HHS.20
As a guideline, HHS initially identified for the Committee
several terms in the exception that required clarification:
1. "Written agreement"
a. What should it contain?
b. Should it be of a minimum duration?
c. Should unwritten side agreements be prohib-
ited?
2. "Eligible organization"
a. Is this term limited to Medicare risk contrac-
tors and arrangements for services provided
under Medicare contracts, or is it broader?
b. Does the exception apply to remuneration only
if it is part of an agreement where an "eligible
organization" is a party, or does it also apply to
14 Id. at 28,410 (stating that the Committee will include an agency representative
from the Department of Health and Human Services in addition to being assisted by
an impartial facilitator).
Isld. at 28,412.
16 "Consensus," according to the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, consists of each
represented interest concurring in the result, unless the term is defined otherwise by
the Committee. The Committee subsequently defined "consensus" as "unanimous
concurrence of those present." See Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared
Risk Exception, Minutes (Negotiation Session, July 28-30, 1997) (last modified Sept.
3, 1998) <http://www.dhhs.gov/progorgloig/negrule/index.htm> at 1.
'7 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 28412. The Committee failed to meet this deadline by
more than a month.
IS See Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, Charter
(last modified Sept. 3, 1998) (visited Nov. 16, 1998) <http'/www.dhhs.gov/progorg/
oiglnegrule/index.htm> (setting forth purpose, authority, functions, structure, meet-
ings, compensation, cost estimates, reports, and termination date of the Committee).
'9 See Himali, supra note 9, at 71 (explaining the process by which the general
outline for expanding safe harbor protection will become an interim final rule).
20 See Negotiated Rulemaking Comm- for the Shared Risk Exception, supra
note 18.
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"downstream" agreements, such as between a
physician and a physician group that has an
agreement with a health maintenance organiza-
tion?
c. Are "organization," as it is implicitly used in
the second part of the exception, and "eligible
organization" synonymous?
3. "Individual or entity providing items or services or
a combination thereof'
a. Would this include entities such as pharmaceu-
tical companies or device manufacturers pro-
viding combinations of items and services?
b. When would these combinations constitute
"bundling" that could be harmful to the federal
health care programs without further protec-
tion?
c. Would "services" be limited to health care
services, or could they include such things as
marketing services?
4. "Substantial financial risk"
a. What factors should be considered in determin-
ing if substantial financial risk exists?
b. Should special treatment be given to encourage
providers to assume risk where they usually do
not, or where risk is difficult to measure?
21
In the months that followed, the Committee discussed all of
these issues, as well as many others, in an effort to create a com-
prehensible framework within which to apply the statutory excep-
tion fairly to health care providers. Each of the seven meetings will
be discussed in chronological order to give the reader an apprecia-
tion for the types of difficulties faced by members of the Commit-
tee in dealing with this task. Not every detail of these meetings
will be recounted - only those which help to explain the basis for
the provisions contained in the proposed interim final rule.
1. June Meeting
The first organizational meeting of the Committee was held in
June 1997. At this meeting, the Committee decided that "remu-
neration" is adequately defined by the statute and would not need
21 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 28,411 (describing specific issues for discussion).
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to be defined any further in the interim final rule.22 The members
also noted that "eligible organization" is defined by the Social Se-
curity Act though there is no corresponding definition for what is
simply meant by an "organization. '" However, none of the mem-
bers believed that "organization" should be limited to only health
maintenance organizations (HMOs). 24 Although the members
agreed that the statutory exception consisted of the two parts dis-
cussed previously,25 they nonetheless realized that other various
terms in the statutory exception required clarification in the in-
terim final rule and that these issues would be discussed in subse-
quent meetings.
2. July Meeting
At the Committee's negotiation session in July 1997, mem-
bers identified what they considered to be the purposes of the
shared risk exception: (1) reduce compliance costs; (2) avoid inter-
ference with developing risk-sharing arrangements that benefit the
market; (3) protect patients against underutilization; (4) provide
clarity because of the possibility of criminal prosecution; (5) pre-
vent "sham" arrangements; and, (6) define legitimate risk-sharing
arrangements.27 The second and sixth purposes were designated as
the most important.28 Most of this meeting was spent discussing
"substantial financial risk." One member suggested using the
twenty-five percent standard applied to physician incentive plans
by the Physician Incentive Plan (PIP) Regulations. 29 (See discus-
sion in Part III.B.4.c.) However, the Committee predicted that
there would be numerous potential problems with copying this
standard. First, it would be difficult to apply the twenty-five per-
2 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, Minutes (Or-
ganizational Meeting, June 17-18, 1997) (last modified Sept. 3, 1998)
<http'/www.dhhs.gov/progorgloiglnegruleindex.htm> at 10 (declining to define
"remuneration").
23 Id. (discussing the need to define "organization").
24 Id. (noting that Committee members indicated that such a limit would not
appl to the definition of "organization").
26 Id. at I I (defining the two parts of the statutory exception).
26 Id. (identifying terms to be clarified in subsequent meetings).
27 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 16,
at 3-4.
28 Id. at 4 (emphasizing two priority goals while noting Committee disagreement
on other goals).
29 Id. at 7 (stating that the member acknowledged that applying this standard to
providers other than physicians was still questionable due to different payment meth-
ods).
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cent rule to providers other than physicians where the method of
payment is different.30 Second, based on the Health Care Financing
Administration's (HCFA) rationale for setting the standard at
twenty-five percent, this percentage arguably would not be set
high enough because of changes in the marketplace since the PIP
Regulations were promulgated. 31 Third, there is a "reasonable
middle" (an area below the threshold where there is still an incen-
tive not to overutilize) not addressed in the PIP Regulations.3 2
Fourth, the PIP Regulations are different because they only cover
referrals and physicians. 33 Fifth, the PIP Regulations are based
only on theory, and not on performance because there is no infor-
mation to indicate a nexus between incentives and quality of
care. 34 Sixth, Congress recognized that one percentage measure
would not necessarily be appropriate for all types of providers.
35
The Committee did, however, reach a consensus on two is-
sues: (1) "or a combination thereof' in the second part of the ex-
ception means that the risk could be for items, services, or both;
and, (2) "obligated to provide" refers to those items or services
which the provider is obligated to provide according to the written
agreement between it and the beneficiary rather than by statute.3 6
(This definition of "obligated to provide" is in conformity with the
comments to the PIP Regulations.) The Committee left open a
third issue of whether the exception covers anything other than
what the provider furnishes directly, including if a referral is itself
a service.37 Two options were considered for resolving this issue.
Under the first option, only services which the provider furnishes
directly or for which the provider is financially responsible (i.e.,
subcontracts) would be covered;38 the exception would not cover a
PIP that takes into account what a physician orders from a labora-
tory or hospital.39 On the other hand, the second option would
3 id.
31 Id. (indicating a member's concerns about the 25% standard).
32 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 16,
at 7.
33 Id. at 7-8.
34 Id. at 8.
35 Id. (stating the last of four main objections other members of the Committee
had to the proposed 25% standard).
36 Id. at 14-15 (noting that the facilitators indicated that the consensus was on
broad concepts and on principle, rather than on exact language as presented).
37 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 16,
at 15.
38 Id.
39 id.
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cover the following: (1) what the provider furnishes directly; (2)
items or services for which the provider is financially responsible;
and, (3) items or services for which the physician could be finan-
cially rewarded. 4 For example, an incentive arrangement in which
the incentive is tied to utilization of hospital services would be one
in which the physician is financially rewarded.4 1 The rationale for
this second option is "that physician services such as referring a
patient for laboratory services or admitting a patient to a hospital
could be considered services that the physician is obligated to pro-
vide when they are medically necessary for the patient. A different
interpretation.., would put a chill on physician risk arrangements
and lose the benefits from incentives that affect physician behav-
ior." 42 Consequently, the Committee was faced with resolving how
to treat subcontracting and other "downstream" arrangements un-
der the statutory exception. Indeed, this would become one of the
major issues debated by the Committee.
3. September Meeting
The Committee held its third meeting in September 1997.
Members discussed a number of issues related to the second part
of the exception. First, should it only apply to "first tier" contracts
(i.e., incentive arrangements between the organization and the first
level contractor), or should "downstream" arrangements also be
protected?43 Second, should "organization" be limited to "health
plans" as that term is defined in other safe harbors? 44 The Com-
mittee noted a number of problems with placing these limitations
on the exception: (1) it would exclude most existing risk-sharing
arrangements; (2) the market might be better off if flexibility is
permitted; (3) it would discourage subcontracting and encourage
aggregation into one level; (4) the effect would be that no risk
would be assumed at the provider level where the most opportunity
exists to manage risk and control costs; (5) reserving protection for
the first tier would not provide a safe harbor for individuals and
entities at lower levels; (6) most health plans are already covered
40 id.
41 id.
42 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 16,
at 15 (providing a rationale for the first option).
43 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, Minutes
(Meeting, Sept. 9-10, 1997) (last modified Sept. 3, 1998) (visited Nov. 16, 1998)
<http://www.dhhs.gov/progorgloiglnegruletindex.htm> at 6 (explaining the qualifi-
cations of the "top relationship between the MCO and first-level contractor").
44 Id. at 6 (defining "organization" as a "health plan").
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under the prepaid plan safe harbor;45 (7) if lower levels do not have
an incentive to manage risks, the effectiveness of the first tier ar-
rangements will be undermined; and, (8) a majority of provider
types would have arrangements that are unprotected. 46 Although
the Committee did not resolve these issues at the September
meeting, it ultimately determined that "downstream" contracts
should be protected if certain requirements are met and "organiza-
tion" should be defined more broadly than "health plan." (See dis-
cussion following in Part III.B.1.)
The third issue the Committee discussed was what items or
services the individual or entity is "obligated to provide" under the
second part of the exception. The Committee reached a consensus
that this requirement would include two categories of items or
services. 47 The first category includes items or services that are
provided directly by the individual or entity or its employees. 48
The second category includes items or services for which the indi-
vidual or entity is financially responsible.49 This second category
includes subcontracts if: (1) the individual or entity pays the sub-
contractor, (2) the organization pays the subcontractor on behalf of
the individual or entity, or (3) the subcontractor is paid by reinsur-
ance obtained by the individual or entity.50 The possibility that the
individual or entity would also be "obligated to provide" those
items or services for which it does not receive payment but for
which it may be rewarded was discussed as well. This last cate-
gory would include two subcategories. The first subcategory in-
cludes arrangements in which there is a close relationship between
the compensation received by the individual or entity and specific
items or services. 52 The second subcategory includes arrangements
in which compensation is tied collectively to efficiencies. 3 The
4' See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (1) (1997) (defining "health plan" very broadly); see
also 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (in) (describing another safe harbor for price reductions
offered in such health plans).
46 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 43,
at 6-7 (explaining the needs and concerns of those who did not concur with the
Committee).
47 Id. at 15 (explaining that of the three categories discussed by the Committee,
the first two are covered by the phrase "obligated to provide").
48 id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 43,
at 15 (explaining that the committee spoke of a third category).
52 Id.
53 Id.
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Committee distinguished the two subcategories in a later meeting
by considering an HMO physician incentive plan. In this situation,
there would be a "close relationship between the compensation"
and "particular items or services" if the panel of doctors whose
risk is collectively considered is small (such as a group of ten
doctors). 54 As the number of doctors who share in the risk in-
creases, dilution will occur.55 The second subcategory would begin
"at the undefined point where there is a diminished effect on utili-
zation."56 Ultimately, the Committee included this last category of
items or services in its proposed interim final rule as a matter to be
adopted by the "HHS Regulatory Authority.
57
The fourth issue addressed by the Committee concerned the
term "substantial financial risk" in the second part of the excep-
tion. First, the Committee discussed what effect "pooling" of risk
would have on "substantial financial risk." As discussed previ-
ously, this concept is also integral to the PIP Regulations. One
member summarized "pooling" as follows: "If you aggregate lives
across plans or product lines, the amount of risk is reduced. This is
recognized in the PIP [Regulations], which allow.., for less com-
prehensive stop-loss protection if more lives are involved. The
more you aggregate, the more risk can be assumed because the risk
becomes more predictable." 58 However, this same individual
pointed out that the problem with pooling is that "to promote effi-
cient delivery, you want the risk to have an impact. If you have ten
doctors' groups, one of which is doing poorly, there is less incen-
tive for them to improve if there is pooling of risk and the others
do well., 59 Another problem is "that if you make the exception
broader, to encompass pooling, the arrangement might include one
risky deal (that seemed to be substantial financial risk) and one
'sweetheart' deal that meant the risk was not real." 6 Consequently,
54 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, Minutes
(Meeting Oct. 8-10, 1997) (last modified Sept. 3, 1998) <http://www.dhhs.gov/
progorg/oigtnegrulelindex.htm> at 15 (meeting to resolve issues of September 1997
Committee meeting).
5 Id. (providing a discussion of options for issues on what items and services
are covered).
'6 Id. at 15-16.
57 See discussion infra, Part III.A. 1.
58 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 43,
at 17-18 (indicating the effect of pooling risk on whether it is "substantial financial
risk").
59 Id. at 18 (providing an example showing how there is less incentive).
6 id.
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no consensus was reached as to this issue during the September
meeting.
A second aspect of "substantial financial risk" discussed by
the Committee was whether this concept should be defined in nu-
merical or non-numerical terms. Members advanced a number of
arguments favoring one over the other. 61 However, the primary
arguments for numerical and non-numerical definitions are that the
former would provide a bright line test and the latter would pro-
vide a flexible test that allows for variations in the market. 62 Like-
wise, the primary arguments against numerical and non-numerical
definitions are that the former would not take into account differ-
ences among providers and the latter would create a "gray area,"
consequently failing to satisfy the amount of clarity that is re-
quired for a criminal statute.63 As a result, the Committee was un-
able to achieve a consensus as to this aspect of "substantial finan-
cial risk," as well.
The fifth issue addressed (and resolved) by the Committee
was that for risk-sharing arrangements between an organization
and an individual or an entity, there is no functional difference
between "withhold" and "bonus" because one could be made to
look like the other.64 The Committee did, however, later define
"bonus" as an arrangement in which "there is no withhold of a
portion of provider fees, but where a pool is created that providers
can access when they meet a predetermined utilization budget or
quality measure... [it] might be an aggregate amount, tied to per-
formance of the whole network, not just individual performance. '" 65
4. October Meeting
At this meeting, the Committee considered how to define a
numerical standard for calculating "substantial financial risk" and
the concept of "swapping." Three alternatives for a numerical
standard were presented. Only the second alternative will be dis-
cussed to avoid confusion and because it provided the rudimentary
basis for the standard which the Committee ultimately adopted.
Under this alternative, the percent of risk is determined by divid-
61 Id. at 19-20 (discussing the needs and concerns of both definitions).
62 Id. at 19 (explaining what might happen if a bright line is drawn).
63 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 43,
at 19-20 (explaining the major criticism in the anti-kickback area).
64 Id. at 39.
65 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 54,
at 12 (defining, in contrast, a substantial fee withhold as a fee withhold that is large
enough to influence the practice pattern of the provider).
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ing the "potential upside gain" estimated on a reasonable basis by
the "base payment rate" which is the amount received during the
contract period.66 The "potential upside gain" would include only
incentives tied to utilization. 67 With some modifications, these two
terms would later be referred to in the proposed safe harbor as the
"target payment" and "minimum payment," respectively. (See dis-
cussion following in Part III.B.4.b.) Furthermore, the Committee
placed two additional requirements on the percent of risk. First, it
must satisfy a specified standard, such as ten percent.6s This
"specified standard" later became twenty percent for non-
institutional individuals or entities and ten percent for institutional
individuals or entities. (See discussion below in Part III.B.4.b.)
Second, the Committee determined that the percent of risk cannot
be the result of a "sham." 69 The Committee offered the following
illustration of this rule:
If a physician is entitled to receive 100 units of payment,
but 10 units are withheld until the end of the year, the base
pay is 90 units. Even if there is an opportunity for a bonus
at the end of the year, the base pay is still 90 units. If there
is a possibility that the physician might have to pay money
at the end of the year to cover a risk pool deficit, this po-
tential obligation is not calculated into the base pay. In
identifying the potential upside gain, all dollars based on
utilization or costs would be estimated, using a reasonable
analysis based on projected cost, utilization, and distribu-
tion. If it is expected that the 10-unit withhold would be
returned plus a bonus of 5 units gained, the potential up-
side gain would be 15. The percent of risk would be cal-
culated by dividing 15 (the potential upside gain) by 90
(the base payment amount), which equals about 16%.70
There are three differences between this percent of risk for-
mula and the analogous calculation under the PIP Regulations.
66 Id., attachment B, at 7 (adding that this second element/alternative was dis-
cussed in the context of physicians/physician groups but could apply to others as
well).
67 Id. at 7-8 (allowing that there might be a provision requiring that the ar-
rangement include quality incentives).
68 Id. at 7 (adding that the Committee had not reached a consensus on this is-
sue)69 Id. (postponing defining this term until a later meeting).
70 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 54,
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First, the PIP Regulations measure risk by theoretical gain or
loss. 71 If the physician is entitled to a bonus that is not limited by
the contract, theoretically the physician could triple his or her in-
come if there was no hospital utilization. 72 The HCFA would con-
sider the potential gain to be the triple income figure.73 Conse-
quently, the concern is that the PIP Regulations "make it [easier]
for providers to 'game' the system by artificially inflating the
amount of risk."74 In contrast, the Committee believed that "poten-
tial upside gain" should be based on a reasonable projection.75
Second, the denominator, or minimum payment, in the PIP
Regulations is based on total compensation as opposed to base
payment; the latter essentially being a "guaranteed amount., 76 The
Committee believed using a base payment would be simpler."
7
Third, base payment does not factor in unquantifiable down-
side risk amounts because those amounts are subjective.78
The Committee also discussed the issue of "swapping." This
term refers to payments under a written agreement that are "cal-
culated with reference to compensation between the organization
and the individual or entity that result in increased payments being
claimed from a Federal health care program." 79 The Committee
questioned whether the concern should be a "swap" deal ("you
give me this for that") increasing costs to a federal health care
program, or if it should be any express or implied agreement that
one deal is contingent upon another.8 An option proposed was to
include language that parallels the following OIG regulation:
[T]he contract health care provider must not claim pay-
ment in any form from the Department or the State agency
for items or services furnished in accordance with the
agreement except as approved by HCFA or the state health
care program, or otherwise shift the burden of such an
71 id.
72 See id.
73 See id.
74 See id.
75 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 54,
at 8.
76 Id., Attachment B, at 8.
77 Id. at 8-9.
78 Id. at 9.
79 Id. at 10.
80 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 54,
at 10 (indicating that the Committee would not support any deal that used govern-
ment patents as a "bargaining tool" and that a '"swap" should be judged by intent).
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agreement to the extent that increased payments are
claimed from Medicare or a State health care program.
The Committee did not reach a consensus on this issue at the Oc-
tober meeting;82 however, the wording of the OIG regulation was
essentially adopted as part of the proposed safe harbor.
5. November Meeting
At this meeting, the Committee first presented an outline of
its interim final rule. In addition to previous issues upon which the
members reached a consensus, the Committee agreed that the first
prong of the safe harbor would include more "covered entities"
than simply "eligible organizations" and that some "downstream"
arrangements would be protected as well.8 3 The Committee Vlaced
four requirements on downstream contracts to be protected, sub-
ject to the "HHS Regulatory Authority." If a downstream ar-
rangement satisfies these four requirements, it will be protected
regardless of whether or not it involves substantial financial risk.8
6
The Committee later retained these four requirements in the final
interim rule - although with a few modifications and additional
criteria.
Members then discussed how "items or services" should be
defined for purposes of the first prong. Two alternatives proposed
were to limit the definition to "medical services" or to adopt an
existing statutory definition.87 However, both alternatives had in-
herent problems. Equating "items or services" to "medical serv-
ices" would exclude transportation that might be covered under
81 Id. at 11 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(m)(1)(i) (1997).
2 id.
83 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, Minutes
(Meeting, Nov. 19-21, 1997) (last modified Feb. 12, 1998). <http://www.dhhs.gov/
progorgloig/negrule/index.htm> at 4 (explaining how the proposal would extend to
"safe harbor protection" beyond section 216 of HIPAA).
84 Id., Attachment B, at 2. (statting that "a downstream provider must have a
contract which:
(A) is set out in writing and signed by the parties to the contract;
(B) specifies the items and services covered by the agreement;
(C) lasts at least one year, and
(D) specifies that the provider cannot claim payment in any form from
Medicare except as approved by HCFA.
Id.
85 See discussion infra Part III.A.l.
86 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 83,
at 5 (noting protection of downstream arrangements).
87 Id. at 9 (outlining alternatives proposed to limit definition).
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Medicare or Medicaid.88 Likewise, a statutory definition would
also present several difficulties. First, the civil monetary provi-
sions already define this term but in a manner that is not appropri-
ate for this exception because "that definition covers some admin-
istrative services that the IG does not want covered." 89 Second, an
existing definition might not cover all managed care services, such
as disease management. 9° The Committee then considered a third
option: defining "items or services" in terms of "health services"
which would include disease management though would exclude
"marketing services." 91 Ultimately, the Committee adopted a defi-
nition in conformity with this last alternative.
Concerning the second prong of the exception, the members
agreed that it addresses situations in which a federal health care
program is paying on a fee-for-service basis.92 They then discussed
possible definitions for "organization" as well as standards for de-
termining substantial financial risk (SFR) and permissible "down-
stream" arrangements. Some Committee members proposed that an
"organization" should be defined as a "health plan."93 Otherwise, if
there is not a sufficient managed care context, "free floaters" could
easily "play with target levels to disguise an arrangement as sub-
stantial financial risk., 94 In other words, the second prong should
only protect legitimate managed care arrangements; not "shams." 95
The proposed interim final rule modified the rudimentary defini-
tion of "organization" developed at this meeting. One of the most
notable modifications was to link the definition of "health plan" to
that provided in the existing safe harbor for these arrangements
codified at 42 C.F.R. 1001.952(l)(2). 96
88 Id. (discussing difficulties associated with limiting the definition to "medical
services").
89 Id. (noting the reasons why the Committee did not adopt a statutory definin-
tion).
90 Id.
91 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 83,
at 9 (noting the option developed at the September meeting that services be required
to be health services or reasonably related to such services).
92 Id. at 10.
9' id. at 10-11. (outlining the federal proposal's definition).
94 Id. (indicating that the federal agencies see the second prong as addressing
legitimate arrangements).
9' Id. at 11.
96 See Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, Minutes
(Meeting, Jan. 21-22, 1998) (last modified Sept. 3, 1998) (visited Nov. 10, 1998)
<http://www.dhhs.gov/progorgoig/negrule/index.htm> at 17 (interpreting exceptions
to the Anti-Kickback Statute).
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Next, the Committee discussed two possible coexisting stan-
dards for determining "substantial financial risk" - a payment
methodology standard and a numeric standard. The proposed pay-
ment methodology standard read in part as follows:
Payment Methodology Standard - a provider is at SFR if
payments are made under any of the following:
(i) full capitation;
(ii) percentage of premium;
(iii) inpatient case rate; or
(iv) per diem (when the length of stay is not in the
control of the provider).97
The Committee retained (i) and (ii) in the proposed interim final
rule. However, "inpatient case rate" was defined at this meeting as
"a hospital inpatient case rate like an inpatient DRG, where there
is less risk of overutilization because of the magnitude of the
services furnished."98 Subsequently, the Committee rewrote the
third possibility to read as follows: "inpatient Federal health care
program DRGs, except those for psychiatric services." 99 Per diem
payments were eliminated altogether, the rationale being "that
there are insufficient controls over the number of days of service
provided when payment is on [a fee-for-service] basis.'1°° How-
ever, some members disagreed, arguing that utilization review and
copayment requirements would provide disincentives for overutili-
zation where payment is based on a prospective per diem basis.' 0 '
In contrast, the numeric standard proposed at this meeting is
essentially the same as the one included in the proposed interim
final rule. The Committee believed that this standard addressed the
kickback concern of overutilization because it was constructed to
include risk arrangements in which providers are penalized for
97 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 83,
Attachment B, at 4.
" Id. at 13.
99 See Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra
note 96, at 20.
10o See Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, Minutes
(Meeting, Dec. 16-18, 1997) (last modified Sept. 3, 1998) <http://www.dhhs.gov/
progorgloiglnegrulelindex.htm> at 9 (arguing that per diem payments were elimi-
nated because there is a lack of control over the length of services when payment is
on an FFS basis).
1o1 See id. (indicating additionally that the Committee would propose specific
language to identify such situations).
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overutilization.10 2 Additionally, it would potentially protect with-
holds and bonuses as well as some case rates and per diems.10 3 The
only significant change in the proposed interim final rule is a bi-
furcation of the percentage requirement. Originally, this figure had
been twenty percent for all providers (i.e., target payments had to
be twenty percent greater than minimum payments). 104 This per-
centage was retained for non-institutional providers though was
lowered to ten percent for institutional providers. 0 5 Although the
possibility of creating this distinction was first raised at the No-
vember meeting, it was not finally resolved until the subsequent
meeting in December. 
°6
Lastly, the Committee determined that, for the second prong,
"downstream" arrangements would only be protected if both the
parties are at substantial financial risk.'0 7 (See discussion follow-
ing in Part III.B.5.) It is important to note that this requirement for
downstream arrangements is different from the corresponding re-
quirement for the first prong. Recall that the first prong does not
require downstream providers to be at SFR as long as the financial
arrangement between the organization and the first tier provider
places the latter at SFR.
6. December Meeting
The December meeting primarily involved discussion of
changes to the proposed interim final rule outlined at the Novem-
ber meeting. Also, the Committee decided that a number of addi-
tional topics should be addressed in the preamble to the safe har-
bor. Changes to the first prong were primarily to clarify certain
terms in the December proposal. Concerning the second prong,
some members pointed out that the scope of this provision is in-
102 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 83,
at 14 (noting, in addition, the exception that some performance bonuses are added
into the calculation of risk percentage).
103 Id. (identifying types of reimbursement that the standard would potentially
protect).
04 Id. (noting that the figure was chosen based on antitrust policy).
105 Compare id., Attachment B, at 4 (explaining the target payment in terms of
earnings by an individual provider) with Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the
Shared Risk Exception, supra note 96, at 20-21 (setting a numeric standard target
payment for when an individual or entity is at substantial financial risk).
"0 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 83,
at 15 (discussing concerns raised by Committee members regarding the 20% figure,
which included the suggestion that the distinction might address these concerns).
107 Id. at 18 (indicating that such an arrangement is illustrated by the Committee
in an example on page 5 of Attachment B).
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tended to cover primarily "arrangements where Medicare is pri-
mary payor on [a fee-for-service] basis for retirees in an employer
plan... [and] would also apply to section 1115 Medicaid waivers
that do not fit under Prong l."'108 Furthermore, they argued, the
intent "was to limit protection under Prong 2 to situations where
the Federal health care program enrollees would be treated the
same from the perspective of the providers as other enrollees, in
spite of the [fee-for-service] payment."' 9 Members also reaffirmed
that self-funded ERISA plans and third party administrators
(TPAs) are excluded from the definition of "organization" under
the second prong."t0 The rationale is that employers and TPAs, if
included within the definition, would have no incentive to reduce
fee-for-service claims to federal health care programs."' With re-
spect to the enumerated requirements for an "organization," the
Committee clarified that the fifty percent requirement in (G)(ii)(a)
(see discussion following in Part III.B.1.) only applies to the
agreement between the organization and the first tier provider; it
does not extend to downstream arrangements." 2 The Committee
also disclosed that after the November meeting it decided to in-
clude a third standard for determining substantial financial risk (in
addition to the payment methodology and numeric standards) -
one for physician incentive plans."13 (See discussion below in Part
III.B.4.c.)
M. THE PROPOSED SAFE HARBORS FOR
CERTAIN MANAGED CARE PLANS AND RISK-
SHARING ARRANGEMENTS
On January 22, 1998, the Committee unveiled its proposed
interim final rule for certain managed care plans and risk-sharing
arrangements." 4 After seven months of meetings and deliberations,
the Committee reached an agreement upon what terms and re-
108 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note
100, at 6.
109 Id.
110 Id. (expressing continued concerns as to the definition of "organizations").
"' Id. at 7.
112 Id. (noting, additionally, that one Committee member questioned the need for
this 50% requirement at the first-tier level).
"3 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note
100, at 11 (stating that the Committee members were willing to accept the physician
incentive plan calculations even though those calculations include some theoretical
bonuses).
114 See Himali, supra note 9, at 69 (discussing the Negotiated Rulemaking Com-
mittee's approval of the proposed expansion of safe harbor protections).
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quirements should be included in the safe harbor. The Committee's
proposal really consists of two safe harbors (referred to as
"prongs"). The first prong (Prong I) protects arrangements in
which the federal government makes a fixed payment to certain
types of managed care organizations (MCOs). It also covers
"downstream" contracts by these MCOs if certain requirements are
met. In contrast, the second prong (Prong II) protects arrangements
in which providers of medical services are placed at SFR for items
and services ordered and reimbursed by a federal health care pro-
gram on a fee-for-service basis. If "downstream" arrangements
place both the upstream and downstream provider at SFR, they too
are protected by Prong II. Again, it should be emphasized that
these two safe harbors will not become effective until the interim
final rule is published in the Federal Register.
15
Before proceeding, it is worth mentioning two other principles
that should be kept in mind when trying to determine if a proposed
arrangement will fit within the language of these safe harbors.
First,
The fact that an arrangement does not comply with a
safe harbor does not mean that an arrangement is illegal.
It is not correct to assume that arrangements outside of a
safe harbor are [prohibited] due to that fact alone .... It
means only that the arrangement does not have guaran-
teed protection .... Numerous managed care arrange-
ments that exist in the market place [sic] today neither
fall within this safe harbor, nor are they illegal."1
6
Therefore, just because a contractual arrangement in the health
care sector does not come within the scope of these two safe har-
bors (or any of the others, for that matter) does not mean that the
arrangement is per se unlawful under the Anti-Kickback Statute.
Of course, at the same time, this does not imply that such ar-
rangements are not possibly prohibited by some other statute or
regulation. "17
Second, an arrangement that potentially comes within the
scope of multiple safe harbors need only satisfy the requirements
115 See id. (describing the two prongs of the proposed interim final rule for safe
harbor expansion).
116 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 96,
at 26. See also supra note 12.
117 See id. (noting that if an arrangement does not meet either of the two safe
harbors, it only means that the arrangement does not have guaranteed protection). See
also supra note 12.
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of one.18 Consequently, in reviewing a prospective arrangement, it
is advisable to determine which, if any, safe harbor requirements
could be most easily satisfied. If slight modification to the ar-
rangement is all that is necessary for protection, the organization
or provider can then be assured that it is not in violation of the
Anti-Kickback Statute.
A. Prong I: Safe Harbor for Managed Care Organizations
Under Federal Health Care Programs
The first safe harbor (Prong I) covers arrangements in
which the federal government makes a fixed payment to "cov-
ered entities." It also protects certain "downstream" contractual
arrangements. Prong I reads as follows:
(n) Price reductions offered to covered entities.
"Remuneration" under the Anti-Kickback Statute
does not include any remuneration between a "cov-
ered entity" (see below) and an individual or entity or
between an upstream individual or entity and its sub-
contractors, subject to the standards below.
1. "Covered Entities"
The first prong provides a definition for "covered entities"
that covers more providers than merely "eligible organizations un-
der section 1876." Recall that the second part of the statutory ex-
ception only protected the latter. Although Prong I includes "eligi-
ble organizations" within the definition of "covered entities," it
also seeks to protect many other providers as well. However, is-
suing rules on these matters is outside the scope of section 216 of
HIPAA and, therefore, must be promulgated under the "HHS
Regulatory Authority" 9 to establish rules constituting "safe har-
bors.' 20 Rulemaking on these issues is governed by the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act (APA) notice and comment procedures, not
the negotiated rulemaking procedures.121 Nonetheless, HHS agreed
that it will consider issuing a rule on matters designated as "HHS
118 See id.
119 See Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub.
L. 100-93, 101 Stat. 680 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
(1994)) (outlining standards for and-kickback provisions).
120 See Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra
note 96, at 10.
121 See id. at 14 n. 2.
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Regulatory Authority" by the Committee.' 22 Specifically, the safe
harbor lists six categories of "covered entities," all except the first
of which are designated as HHS Regulatory Authority:
" Eligible organizations under section 1876 include: (1)
risk-based HMOs and competitive medical plans
(CMPs) with Medicare contracts; (2) for arrangements
with "first tier" individuals or entities only, cost-based
HMOs and CMPs with Medicare contracts; and, (3) for
arrangements with "first tier" individuals or entities
only, federally qualified HMOs (without regard to
Medicare contracts) for their capitated enrollees, in-
cluding where a federal health care program is a sec-
ondary payor.
12
* Any Medicare Part C health plan which receives a
capitated payment from Medicare and which must have
its total Medicare beneficiary cost sharing approved by
HCFA under section 1854 of the Social Security Act
[42 U.S.C. §1395w-24]. However, Medicare+Choice
fee-for-service panels and medical savings account
plans are excluded. 124
" Medicaid MCOs as defined in section 1903(m)(1)(A)
[42 U.S.C. §1396b(m)(1)(A)] (except for fee-for-
service plans or medical savings accounts) which pro-
vide or arrange for services for Medicaid enrollees un-
der a contract pursuant to section 1903(m) [42 U.S.C.
§1396b(m)]. Also included are section 1915(b) [42
U.S.C. §1396n(b)] waivers, section 1115 [42 U.S.C.
§1315] waivers that do not waive section 1903(m) [42
U.S.C. §1396b(m)] provisions, and Medicaid MCOs
under section 1932 [42 U.S.C. §13964-2].' 25
* Medicaid MCOs that waive section 1903(m) [42
U.S.C. §1396b(m)] provisions, if they have risk-based
122 See id. at 10.
123 Id. at 13.
124 Id. at 13-14.
125 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 96,
at 14.
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contracts with a state agency and provide or arrange
for services for Medicaid enrollees and meet all of the
requirements of section 1903(m) [42 U.S.C.
§1396b(m)] except for section 1903(m)(2)(a)(vi) [42
U.S.C. §1396b(m)(2)(a)(vi)] as waived by the Secre-
tary.
1 26
* The Programs of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly
(PACE) 127 except the for-profit demonstrations under
sections 4801(h) and 4802(h). 28
* TRICARE.' 29
2. "First Tier" and "Downstream" Arrangements
The first prong then addresses "first tier" contracts and con-
tracts between upstream and downstream individuals and entities.
If a covered entity enters into a contract with an individual or en-
tity (first tier) to provide "items or services"'130 to its members, the
contract must:
31
1. be written and signed by both parties;
126 See id. "The language for the safe harbor will also provide coverage for ar-
rangements with the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System." Id. at 14 n.3.
'27 42 U.S.C. § 1395eee (1994) (describing payments to and coverage of benefits
under the PACE program).
128 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 96,
at 14.
'29 Id. See also 32 C.F.R. § 199.17 (1997) (detailing the TRICARE program).
-o' For purposes of this safe harbor, "items or services only includes health items,
devices, supplies, or services or those reasonably related to the provision of health
care items, devices, supplies or services provided to enrollees, including, but not
limited to, non-emergency transportation, patient education, attendant services, social
services (e.g., case management), utilization review and quality assurance. Marketing
services and services provided prior to enrollment are not covered." Negotiated
Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 96, at 16. "However,
simply because such services are not included in the safe harbor does not mean that
they are per se illegal. Nurse call-in lines for current enrollees of an organization are
not marketing under this regulation. Marketing does include items such as *value-
added services.' The definition... includes services provided to individuals or enti-
ties that are reasonably related to the services being delivered to enrollees (i.e., dis-
ease management)." Id. at 28. According to the Chief Counsel for the 01G, the in-
terim final rule will likely cover similar call-in services by other professional groups,
such as pharmacies. See also Himali, supra note 9, at 71 (describing the types of
"items or services" covered by the proposed safe harbor).
131 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 96,
at 15.
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2. specify the items and services covered by the agree-
ment;
3. be for a period of not less than one year; and
4. specify that the individual or entity cannot claim pay-
ment in any form from a federal health care program
for items and services covered under the agreement
(with one exception). 32
Covered entities cannot claim payment from a federal health
care program for items or services, other than the contractual
amounts set forth in the covered entity's agreement with the fed-
eral health care program, unless they are within the exception to
the fourth requirement. 1
33
Although regulating contracts between upstream and down-
stream providers is under the "HHS Regulatory Authority," the
Committee has proposed that these contracts generally fulfill the
same requirements listed below for first tier contracts.
34
Note also that there is no downstream protection for the fol-
lowing: federally qualified health centers (FQHCs) receiving sup-
plemental payments; cost-based HMOs; and federally qualified
HMOs.' 35 However, first tier arrangements between a covered en-
tity and an FQHC are covered.136
3. "Swapping" Under Prong I
Under the first prong, "swapping" is specifically prohibited.
One party to a contract cannot provide or receive remuneration in
return for or to induce the other party to provide or accept business
(other than that covered by the contract) for which payment can be
made by a federal health care program on a fee-for-service or cost
132 The exception is for "[flederally qualified HMOs or Medicare 1876 cost con-
tractors where the Federally qualified HMO, Medicare section 1876 cost contractor,
or its first tier provider is billing a Federal health care program, in which case, the
billing arrangement must be set forth in the agreement." Id.
13 See id.
134 See id. (proposing that a contract between an upstream and a downstream
individual entity:. (a) be set out in writing and signed by the parties to the contract; (b)
specify the items and services covered by the agreement; (c) be for a period of at least
one year, and (d) specify that the individual or entity cannot claim payment in any
form from a federal health care program).
135 See id. (listing instances where no downstream protection is provided).
136 See Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra
note 96, at 15 (stating when downstream protection is provided).
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basis.' 37 In addition, the arrangement is not protected if it shifts the
burden such that increased payments are claimed from a federal
health care program. 138 "The language 'shifts the burden' . .. [re-
fers to the fact] that the financial burden of an arrangement cannot
be shifted to a Federal program. For example, an individual or en-
tity cannot increase the number of claims submitted or increase the
charges or costs for services in order to subsidize the costs of other
less profitable lines of business."'
139
"The basic fear [of "swapping"] ... is that those negotiating
health insurance contracts are using their Medicare beneficiary
population as a tool or bargaining chip to negotiate lower rates for
the rest of the covered lives in the plan."'14 Whether "swapping" is
a legitimate concern remains controversial among the Committee
members. Some members argue that employers negotiating health
insurance contracts are not trying to contrive ways to defraud the
Medicare program. 141 According to these proponents, what is
"driving the marketplace ... is a sincere desire to reduce costs,
and risk-sharing arrangements are one way to do that."' 42 The pos-
sibility of swapping, the argument continues, is minimal and "de-
signing a safe harbor [based] on the fear of swapping [is] tanta-
mount to... 'the tail wagging the dog." ' 143
B. Prong II: Safe Harbor for Managed Care Risk-Sharing
Arrangements Where a Federal Program Pays on a Fee-For-
Service Basis
Prong II establishes a safe harbor for both managed care risk-
sharing arrangements in which a federal program pays on a fee-
for-service basis and Medicaid section 1115 waivers that do not fit
within Prong I.144 It primarily applies to arrangements in which
"Medicare is the primary payer on a fee-for-service basis for retir-
'37 See id. at 15-16 (listing the instances when remuneration may be neither given
nor received by either the upstream or downstream provider).
138 See id. at 16 (explaining when an agreement between an upstream and a
downstream provider is not protected).
139 Id. at 30 (explaining when the burden is shifted in an arrangement between an
upstream and a downstream provider).
140 Ursula Himali, Managed Care: Upcoming Medicare Anti-Kickback Safe Har-
bor to Offer Narrow Exception, MEDICARE REP. (BNA) 1, 4 (Jan. 2, 1998).
141 See id. (noting very few employers actually -scheme" to defraud the govern-
ment in this manner).
142 Id.
143 id.
144 See Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra
note 96, at 17 n. 4 (listing what is included in Prong II).
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ees in an employer-sponsored plan."' 45 Consequently, its scope is
very narrow in contrast to Prong I which protects most Medicare
health maintenance organizations. 46 As discussed previously, the
reason that its applicability is limited is because placing providers
at SFR is unusual in a fee-for-service health plan.' 47 The safe har-
bor reads as follows:
Managed care organization risk-sharing arrangements
"Remuneration" under the anti-kickback statute does
not include any remuneration between an organiza-
tion and an individual or entity or between an up-
stream individual or entity and its subcontractors,
where there is a risk-sharing arrangement (RSA) that
puts the individual or entity at substantial financial
risk (SFR) for the cost or utilization of items or
services, if the requirements below are met.
The "requirements below" concern what must be contained in
a written agreement; what qualifies as an "organization"; what
constitutes a "risk-sharing arrangement"; what types of upstream
and downstream arrangements are permissible; when "substantial
financial risk" exists; and what "items or services"' 4 the individ-
ual or entity is "obligated to provide."'
' 49
145 Himali, supra note 9, at 69 (explaining why the second prong of the proposed
safe harbor is very narrow).
146 See id. at 69-70 (noting that the first prong creates a safe harbor for arrange-
ments in which the government makes a fixed payment to a Medicare HMO).
147 See id. at 70 (noting that the Inspector General of the Department of Health
and Human Services disputes the "narrow" characterization of Prong II).
148 "Items or services" is limited to "health items, devices, supplies, or services
or those reasonably related to the provision of health care items, devices, supplies or
services provided to enrollees, including, but not limited to, non-emergency trans-
portation, patient education, attendant services, social services (e.g., case manage-
ment), utilization review and quality assurance. Marketing services and services pro-
vided prior to enrollment are not covered." Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the
Shared Risk Exception, supra note 96, at 24.
149 The items or services for which the individual or entity is "obligated to pro-
vide" include:
(A) services provided directly by the individual or entity and its em-
ployees;
(B) services for which the individual or entity is financially responsible
but which are provided by subcontractors;
(C) services for which the individual or entity makes referrals or ar-
rangements (HHS Regulatory Authority); and
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1. "Organization"
An "organization" is any "health plan" as defined by 42
C.F.R. 101.952(l)(2)'50 that also provides a comprehensive range
of health services. In addition, the health plan must provide for:
(A) reasonable utilization goals to avoid inappropriate
utilization;
(B) an operational utilization review program;
(C) a quality assurance program that promotes the coor-
dination of care, protects against underutilization,
and specifies patient goals, including measurable out-
comes where appropriate;
(D) grievance and hearing procedures;
(E) protection for members from incurring financial li-
ability (except as to copayments and deductibles);
(F) no treatment for Federal health care program benefi-
ciaries that is any different than other enrollees due
to their status as Federal health care program benefi-
ciaries; and
(G) either
(D) services for which individuals or entities receive incentives based on
his or her own, group, or plan's performance. (HHS Regulatory
Authority)
Id. at 22 (emphasis omitted).
150 "Health plan" means an entity that furnishes or arranges under agreement
with contract health care providers for the furnishing of items or services to enrollees,
or furnishes insurance coverage for the provision of such items and services, in ex-
change for a premium or a fee, where such entity:
(i) Operates in accordance with a contract, agreement or statutory dem-
onstration authority approved by HCFA or a State health care pro-
gram;
(ii) Charges a premium and its premium structure is regulated under a
State insurance statute or a State enabling statue governing health
maintenance organizations or preferred provider organizations;
(iii) Is an employer, if the enrollees of the plan are current or retired em-
ployees, or is a union welfare fund, if the enrollees of the plan are
union members; or
(iv) Is licensed in the State, is under contract with an employer, union
welfare fund, or a company furnishing health insurance coverage as
described in conditions (ii) and (iii) of this definition, and is paid a
fee for the administration of the plan which reflects the fair market
value of those services.
42 C.F.R. 1001.952(t)(2) (1997).
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(i) no more than ten percent Medicare benefi-
ciaries as enrollees where a Federal health care
program is primary
or
(ii)(a) at least fifty percent non-Medicare benefi-
ciaries as enrollees where a Federal health care
program is not primary
and
(b) receipt of payments for premiums under the
RSA on a periodic basis that does not take into
account the dates services are provided, the fre-
quency of services, or the extent or kind of
services provided.15'
Consequently, these additional requirements cause the second
prong to be narrower than the existing safe harbor for health plans
under 42 C.F.R. 100.952(1).
Because only MCOs (and even then, only certain MCOs) fit
within the definition of "organization," it is likely that the policy
underlying these requirements is HCFA's desire to ensure that the
MCOs have in place measures to protect the rights of patients
(quality assurance programs, grievance procedures, etc.) as well as
ones to prevent unnecessary costs (utilization review, etc.).
The Committee also points out in this proposed safe harbor
that an organization's written agreements which are protected do
not lose protection simply because the organization has additional
unprotected agreements. 52 Oddly enough, there is no similar pro-
vision under the first prong. The minutes from the Committee
meetings do not indicate if this omission was intentional or merely
an oversight.
2. Written Agreement
The risk-sharing arrangement, whether between an organiza-
tion and a first tier provider or between downstream providers,
must satisfy the following requirements:
(A) set out in writing and signed by the parties;
(B) specify the items and services covered by the
agreement;
151 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 96,
at 17-18 (listing the provisions each written agreement of the organization must con-
tain in order to qualify for protection).
152 See id. at 18 (explaining that an organization's written arguments remain
protected despite other non-protected agreements).
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(C) specify the intervals at which distributions
will be paid;
(D) specify the formula for calculating incentives
and penalties;
(E) set out that the arrangement is for a period of
at least one year;
(F) specify the methodology for determining
compensation which is commercially reason-
able and which is set in advance in arms-
length negotiations; and
(G) require participation in a quality assurance
program that promotes the coordination of
care, protects against underutilization, and
specifies patient goals, including measurable
outcomes where appropriate.
5 3
3. "Risk-sharing Arrangement"
The safe harbor provides an elaborate definition of "risk-
sharing arrangement." In general, for an arrangement to be con-
sidered an RSA, it must: (1) include items or services covered
by a federal health care program; (2) require that the organiza-
tion, rather than the entity or individual, bill the federal health
care programs for these services; '4 and, (3) not set payment
rates based on the source of payment or billing method. 5 The
reason for the third requirement is to ensure "that, even if Medi-
care services are paid on [a fee-for-service] basis, Medicare
beneficiaries will be treated the same as other enrollees in the
health plan."' 56 Historically, there has been a problem of
"grouping the patients by payor source [which] could mean that
over-65 Medicare beneficiaries would not be treated the same as
any over-65 employees in the commercial plan, even if their
I5 ld. at 24.
154 "In the case of a self-funded employer plan that contracts with an organiza-
tion to provide administrative services (i.e., a TPA or an ASO) the self-funded em-
ployer plan must bill." Id. at 18 n.5 (providing an example of an organization re-
quired to bill). These self-funded employer plans are governed by ERISA. See Hi-
mali, supra note 140, at 2-3 (discussing whether to include the ERISA-covered plans
in the safe harbor plan).
15 See Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra
note 96, at 18 (explaining when arrangements do not qualify for protection as risk-
sharing arrangements).
156 Id. at 7.
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health status [was] the same., 157 Consequently, the fee-for-
service "population could be 'gamed' and therefore [the gov-
ernment needs] the assurance that this population is being
treated the same as other enrollees and is subject to the same
utilization targets." '158 A number of specific arrangements are
also listed as qualifying for an RSA:
" An arrangement is deemed to be an RSA if the
organization receives a fixed, periodic payment
for its non-Federal health care program fee-for-
service enrollees, and includes Federal health
care program beneficiaries in its downstream
RSAs.
* Inpatient services provided by hospitals will be
deemed to be part of the RSA if the hospital is
reimbursed by the Federal health care program
directly on a DRG basis. Organizations must
reimburse hospitals for inpatient hospital serv-
ices provided to non-Medicare enrollees on a
DRG basis, although payment amounts may be
different.
* Part B services will be deemed included in the
RSA if the Part B supplier receives a capitated
or other risk payment from the organization (or
the upstream individual or entity) and reassigns
its rights to Federal health care program fee-
for-service payments to the organization. 159
However, "[t]he safe harbor does not protect any arrangement
between a first tier individual or entity and an organization where
the individual or entity has an investment interest in the organiza-
tion, unless the investment interest [satisfies the "large entity" safe
harbor of] 42 C.F.R. 1001.952(a)(1)." 16° Consequently, the second
157 Id. (explaining the problem created when patients are grouped by payor
source).
158 Id. (explaining that the federal agencies fear the fee-for-service population is
being treated differently).
' 
9 Id. at 18-19 (detailing the specific arrangements which qualify as risk-
sharing).
160 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 96,
at 19-20 (explaining when arrangements are not protected under the isk-sharing safe
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prong does not protect provider-owned entities, such as physician
hospital organizations (PHOs), management service organizations
(MSOs), provider sponsored organizations (PSOs), and IPAs
owned by physicians.' 6' The rationale, according to the Chief
Counsel for the OIG, is that if
The providers own the plan, we could end up in a situation
where money is just being transferred from one pocket to
another and we wouldn't have substantial financial risk...
[t]o the extent that the plan doesn't pay out money because
they didn't meet their goals [but] keeps that money as
profit and the profit then gets distributed to the same peo-
ple.., we're talking about taking money from one pocket
and putting it in the other pocket. That's not real substan-
tial financial risk. 62
4. "Substantial Financial Risk"
An RSA must satisfy one of three standards for the provider
to be at substantial financial risk (SFR): (1) payment methodology
standard, (2) numeric standard, or (3) physician incentive plan
standard. Each of these will be discussed in turn.
a. Payment Methodology Standard
Individuals or entities are at SFR if the payments they receive
under an RSA are made according to one of the following: full
capitation; percentage of premium; or inpatient federal health care
program diagnosis related groups (DRGs), except those for psy-
chiatric services.' 63 The Committee has not defined "full capita-
tion" and will seek comments as to the extent to which it is impli-
cated by the purchase of stop-loss insurance 64 or contractual pro-
harbor). The requirements of 42 C.F.R. 1001.952(a)(1) are generally considered dif-
ficult to satisfy.
161 See Himali, supra note 9, at 71 (noting that provider-owned entities do not
have the substantial financial risk that is required by Prong II because money merely
changes pockets in this relationship).
Id.
163 See Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra
note 96, at 20 (explaining what payment methods under a risk-sharing arrangement
put an individual or entity at substantial financial risk).
164 "Stop-loss insurance is an arrangement whereby a risk-bearing provider or
other insurer buys coverage to limit undue losses. At issue is at what point is there no
longer enough risk to satisfy the payment standard?" Himali, supra note 9, at 72.
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visions concerning limitation of financial liability.165 Nonetheless,
the Committee did state during one of its earlier meetings that "full
capitation" in this standard "would not preclude the use of reinsur-
ance or taking capitation only for part of the services provided; if
part of the services are 'carved out' and paid on [a fee-for-service]
basis, however, ... only the part that is capitated would be pro-
tected."' 66 It should also be noted that "the reimbursement must be
reasonable given the historical utilization patterns and costs for the
same or comparable population in similar managed care arrange-
ments."' 167 Concerning DRGs, HHS has had past enforcement
problems for psychiatric services and some members believed they
should be excluded to protect patients seeking those medical serv-
ices.'(' Specifically, they were concerned that psychiatric admis-
sions could be "manipulated."' 69
b. Numeric Standard
This standard compares the provider's "target payment" and
"minimum payment" to determine what percentage of income is at
risk. "[T]arget payment is the fair market value payment estab-
lished through arms [sic] length negotiations that will be earned" if
target utilization is reached. It does not include any bonuses or
fees for achieving utilization below the target level. 170 "[M]inimum
payment," on the other hand, is "the guaranteed amount that an
individual or entity is entitled to receive under the contract.
17 1
Both target payments and minimum payments include bonuses for
performance (such as timely submission of paperwork and attend-
ing meetings) at a level which is achieved by seventy-five percent
165 See Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra
note 96, at 29 (stating that the Committee will seek comments regarding the extent to
which capitation is directly implicated by contractual provisions).
166 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 93,
at 13.
167 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 96,
at 20.
168 See id. at 30 (stating that DRGs are not used in psychiatric services related to
protection of the patient).
169 See Negotiated Rulemaking Comm.for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note
100, at 10 (arguing that federal agencies do not have the same level of comfort when
dealing with psychiatric admissions due to fear that they could be manipulated).
170 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 96,
at 21 (defining target payment).
171 id.
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of participating providers that are paid a performance bonus based
on the same structure.
1 72
"Non-institutional" providers must have a target payment that
is at least twenty percent greater than the minimum payment to be
at SFR.173 In contrast, "institutional" providers are only required to
have a target payment that is at least ten percent greater than the
minimum payment to be at SFR.174 "Institutional" providers is
limited to hospitals and nursing homes. 175 The Committee specifi-
cally stated that pooling of money by physicians and hospitals,
such as by forming a joint venture PHO, would not qualify as an
institution.1 76 At the December meeting, the rationale given for this
distinction "was that institutional providers have greater capital
costs affecting what risk they can bear."' 77 Additionally, the Chief
Counsel for the OIG stated that it "is 'a reflection that their [hos-
pitals' and nursing homes'] operating margins are much smaller
than the typical [Medicare] Part B provider like a physician's of-
fice.""1[78 Moreover, the Committee emphasized that it "will re-
quest the submission of data on the appropriateness of different
target payment percentages for institutional and non-institutional
individuals or entities during the comment period."'' 79 Specifically,
the Committee will inquire as to whether FQHCs should be cate-
gorized as institutions.180
The following provides an example of how to determine sub-
stantial financial risk for a non-institutional individual or entity:
172 See id. (comparing similar requirements for target and minimum payments).
173 See id. at 20 (stating the numeric standard for SFR for non-institutional indi-
viduals or entities).
174 See id. (stating the numeric standard for SFR for institutional individuals or
entities).
175 See Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra
note 96, at 20.
176 See id. at 6 (discussing which numeric standard for SFR should apply where
hos ital or physician money is pooled).
Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note
100, at 10 (arguing that institutional providers have greater capital and should be able
to bear more risks).
178 Himali, supra note 9, at 71 (discussing the reasons for requiring different tar-
get payments for different types of providers).
179 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 96,
at 28.
180 See id. at 7 (noting that "the preamble topic on the appropriateness of pay-
ment percentages was modified to indicate that the preamble will inquire about" what
numeric standard for SFR should apply to FQHCs).
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If the target payment is $80, the minimum payment is $60,
and the $20 withheld goes into risk pools ($5 for specialty
services and $15 for hospital services) and if the provider
would get all of the $20 back by hitting the proper target
(expected utilization based on [reasonable] principles), the
ratio would be $20 over $60 (33.3%) and the 20% standard
would be met. If performance bonuses (i.e., non-utilization
based bonuses) totaling $100 are expected to be earned by
75% of providers, this amount would be added into both
the target payment and the minimum payment, so the ratio
would be $20 over $160 (12.5%). In this calculation, it
would not matter if the $20 were a penalty that the pro-
vider had to pay back instead of a withhold. '8'
Prong II also includes the caveat that "the arrangement must
ensure that the amount at risk, i.e., the bonus/withhold, is earned
by an individual or entity in direct relation to the ratio of the actual
to the target utilization. The minimum payment may not be set ar-
tificially low."' This rule will help to ensure that the policy basis
for encouraging risk-sharing is not compromised by deceptive
payment arrangements.
c. Physician Incentive Plan (PIP) Standard
Even before this proposed safe harbor, HHS promulgated
rules governing physician incentive plans (i.e., the PIP Regula-
tions) 83 and created a PIP exception under the Stark regulations. 84
The PIP standard under the proposed safe harbor reads as follows:
Physician Incentive Plan Standard. [A] physician is at SFR
if:
(i) the upstream individual or entity has placed the phy-
sician at substantial financial risk for referral services
in an amount that exceeds the substantial financial
risk threshold under the Department's physician in-
centive plan regulations and the arrangement is in
181 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 83,
at 14.
182 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 96,
at 20 n.6.
183 See 42 C.F.R. § 417.479 (1997) (outlining requirements and defining terms
for physician incentive plans).
'
84 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 411.1-411.408 (1997).
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compliance with the stop-loss and beneficiary survey
requirements of those regulations.
(ii) notwithstanding the foregoing, an individual or entity
will not be at substantial financial risk, for purposes
of this standard, if the atient panel size is 25,000
covered lives or greater.
The Committee essentially adopted these requirements from
the PIP Regulations. Consequently, if a health plan is at substantial
financial risk under the PIP Regulations, it will also be at SFR un-
der Prong II.
5. "Downstream" Contractual Arrangements
This safe harbor, as with the PIP Regulations and Stark ex-
ception for physician incentive plans, provides protection for cer-
tain arrangements between upstream and downstream individuals
or entities. However, "downstream individuals or entities are only
protected if they are paid on an SFR basis by another individual or
entity who is also paid on an SFR basis. In other words, contracts
involving an individual or entity which is not paid on an SFR basis
are not protected for any party."'86 This rule can best be under-
stood by referring to the following diagram:
185 Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 96,
at 21 (emphasis omitted).
's Id. at 22.
1999]
74 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 9:37
1. HMO (capitated)
arrangement between levels 1 and 2 protected
2. PHO (percentage of premium -- physician and hospital services)
arrangement between levels 2 and 3 not protected
3. IPA (fee-for-service) ("Non-SFR Individual or entity")
arrangement between levels 3 and 4 not protected
4. Physician group (capitated)
arrangement between levels 4 and 5 protected
5. Physician (capitated) 187
187 Id. at 22-23.
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In developing the proposed safe harbor, the Committee be-
lieved that this additional requirement was necessary "to prevent
fee-for-service or cost-based kickbacks disguised as risk-sharing
arrangements."'18 (Also referred to as "swapping.")'1 9 Although
the Committee does not give much further explanation as to the
basis for their concern, one can imagine the problems that might
result if, for instance, the arrangement between Levels 3 and 4
were protected. The IPA at Level 3 is paid by the PHO at Level 2
on a fee-for-service basis. Consequently, the IPA has no incentive
to control utilization of services; more services provided by the
downstream providers means more money that the IPA will re-
ceive from the PHO. Therefore, even though the IPA is paying the
physician group at Level 4 on a capitated basis, the IPA would
have an incentive to encourage the physician groups to overutilize
services (through such tactics as "kickbacks"). This result would
be contrary to both the reasons for capitation and the reasons that
justify exempting PIPs under the proposed safe harbor.
This requirement that both the upstream and downstream pro-
viders be paid on a basis which places them at SFR is more limit-
ing than the corresponding requirements for subcontracting ar-
rangements under the PIP Regulations. The PIP Regulations only
focus on whether the subcontracting ("downstream") component of
the contractual arrangement involves substantial financial risk.
There is no requirement that the upstream provider under the sub-
contracting arrangement also be at SFR. If the subcontractor is
placed at SFR under the terms of the subcontract, the inquiry ends.
Because the Stark exception also adopts the PIP Regulations stan-
dards, it too is only concerned with substantial financial risk at the
subcontract level.
This difference between Prong I, on the one hand, and the PIP
Regulations and Stark exception, on the other hand, has already
drawn sharp criticism. One commentator believes that this pro-
posed safe harbor is so limited in applicability that it offers little
protection for most managed care plans as they are currently
structured.19°
"' Id. at 22.
189 "Swapping" refers to when a party provides or "receives remuneration in
return for or to induce the other party to provide or accept business (other than that
covered by the arrangement) for which payment may be made... by a Federal health
care program on a fee-for-service or cost basis." Id. at 15-16.
1 See Himali, supra note 9, at 70-71 (arguing that Prong II is too narrowly
drafted to prevent some providers from creating sham risk-sharing arrangements).
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6. "Swapping" Under Prong II
As with the first prong, "swapping" is also not permitted un-
der Prong II. One party cannot provide or receive "remuneration in
return for or to induce the other party to provide or accept business
(other than that covered by [contract]) for which payment may be
made... by a Federal health care program on a fee-for-service or
cost basis.' 19' In addition, the arrangement would not be protected
if it shifts the burden of such an arrangement to the extent that in-
creased payments are claimed from a federal health care pro-
gram. 192
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE PROPOSED SAFE
HARBORS
The two new safe harbors contained in the proposed interim
final rule will not become effective until they are published in the
Federal Register. Although the Chief Counsel for the OIG at one
point believed that the interim final rule would be published by the
end of April 1998,193 more recent opinions indicate that a better
estimate is sometime toward the beginning of 1999. Ironically, it
might actually be best if HHS delays publishing its interim final
rule anytime soon. Based on the discussions throughout this Arti-
cle, it is obvious that the complicated language of the proposed
interim final rule requires serious revision in order to be under-
stood by those individuals who are expected to interpret and apply
the safe harbors. Regardless of whether or not the criticism that the
safe harbors are too "narrow" is valid, one cannot ignore the fact
that both safe harbors are worded in such a way as to generate nu-
merous ambiguities and inconsistencies. Even the current names of
the proposed safe harbors are misleading as to what types of ar-
rangements they are aimed at protecting. 194 Consequently, it would
19' Negotiated Rulemaking Comm. for the Shared Risk Exception, supra note 96,
at 24.
192 See id. (stating, however, that this requirement does not "prevent parties from
establishing different payment rates for different products").
193 See Himali, supra note 9, at 69 (noting that, in a special report published in
January of 1998, D. McCarty Thornton, Chief Counsel at the 01G, indicated that he
expected an interim final rule to be published in the Federal Register "within the next
three months").
194 For example, Prong I is entitled "Price reductions offered to covered entities,"
which gives no indication that it primarily covers arrangements in which the provider
receives afixed payment from a federal health care program. Additionally, Prong II is
designated as "Managed care organization risk-sharing arrangements," which seems
almost directly contradictory to the fact that it mainly covers arrangements in which a
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undoubtedly be wise for HHS to take the time to redraft the pro-
posal to ensure that it precisely reflects the true intent of its
authors. This task should be completed even if HHS does not wish
to change any of the substantive provisions. After all, nowhere in
the Committee's charter does it state that one of its goals would be
to generate more work and frustration for lawyers and health care
providers alike.
provider receives payments from a federal health care program on a fee-for-service
basis.
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